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1Abstract. Equilibria in dynamic games are often formulated under the assump-
tion that players have full knowledge of the dynamics they are subject to. Here we
formulate equilibria in which players are looking for robustness and take model un-
certainty explicitly into account in their decisions. Speciﬁcally we consider feedback
Nash equilibria in indeﬁnite linear-quadratic diﬀerential games on an inﬁnite time
horizon. Model uncertainty is represented by a malevolent input which is subject to
a cost penalty or to a direct bound. We derive conditions for the existence of robust
equilibria in terms of solutions of sets of algebraic Riccati equations.
Key Words. Feedback Nash equilibrium, robust design, linear-quadratic diﬀer-
ential games, soft-constrained diﬀerential games, risk sensitivity.
21 Introduction
Dynamic game theory brings together three features that are key to many situa-
tions in economy, ecology, and elsewhere: optimizing behavior, presence of multiple
agents, and enduring consequences of decisions. In this paper we add a fourth as-
pect, namely robustness with respect to variability in the environment. In usual
formulations of dynamic games, a set of diﬀerential or diﬀerence equations is spec-
iﬁed including input functions that are controlled by the players, and players are
assumed to optimize a criterion over time. The dynamic model is supposed to be an
exact representation of the environment in which the players act; optimization takes
place with no regard of possible deviations. It can safely be assumed, however, that
agents in reality follow a diﬀerent strategy. If an accurate model can be formed at
all, it would in general be complicated and diﬃcult to handle. Moreover it may be
unwise to optimize on the basis of a too detailed model, in view of possible changes
i nd y n a m i c st h a tm a yt a k ep l a c ei nt h ec o u r s eo ft i m ea n dt h a tm a yb eh a r dt o
predict. It makes more sense for agents to work on the basis of a relatively simple
model and to look for strategies that are robust with respect to deviations between
the model and reality. In an economic context, the importance of incorporating
aversion to speciﬁcation uncertainty has been stressed for instance by Ref. 1.
In control theory, an extensive theory of robust design is already in place; see
Ref. 2 for a survey. We use this background to arrive at suitable ways of describing
aversion to model risk in a dynamic game context. We assume linear dynamics
and quadratic cost functions. These assumptions are reasonable for situations of
dynamic quasi-equilibrium, where no large excursions of the state vector are to be
expected; also from the point of view of development of theory, the linear-quadratic
case is a natural place to start. Following a pattern that has become standard in
control theory, we introduce a malevolent disturbance input that will be used in the





Biui(t)+Ew(t),x (0) = x0 (1)
where N is the number of players, x is the n-dimensional state of the system, ui
contains the mi (control) variables that are chosen by player i, w is a q-dimensional
disturbance vector aﬀecting the system, x0 is the initial state of the system, and A,
Bi,a n dE are constant matrices containing system parameters. By combining (1)
with an equation that expresses the disturbance w(t) as a function of the state x(t),
one can express deviations from the nominal dynamics represented by the matrix
A.
We have to specify the strategy space and the information structure available
to players. In this paper we will assume a full state information structure, and we
restrict the players to stabilizing constant linear feedback strategies. So we shall only
consider controls ui of the type ui = Fix,w i t hFi ∈ I Rmi×n,a n dw h e r e( F1,···,F N)
belongs to the set
F := {F =( F1,···,F N) | A +
PN
i=1 BiFi is stable}.
3The stabilization constraint is imposed to ensure the ﬁniteness of the inﬁnite-horizon
cost integrals that we will consider; also, the assumption helps to justify our basic
supposition that the state vector remains close to the origin. Obviously the con-
straint is a bit unwieldy since it introduces dependence between the strategy spaces
of the players. However, we will focus below on equilibria in which the inequalities
that ensure the stability property are inactive constraints. It will be a standing as-
sumption that the set F is non-empty; a necessary and suﬃcient condition for this
to hold is that the matrix pair (A,[B1 ···BN]) is stabilizable. Given that we work
below with an inﬁnite horizon, restraining the players to constant feedback strategies
seems reasonable; to prescribe linearity may also seem natural in the linear-quadratic
context that we assume, although there is no way to exclude ap r i o r iequilibria in
nonlinear feedback strategies. Questions regarding the existence of such equilibria
are outside the scope of this paper.
We now come to the formulation of the objective functions of the players. Our











Here, Qi is symmetric and Rii is positive deﬁnite for all i =1 ,...,N.I n m a n y
applications, state changes that are beneﬁcial to some players may be harmful to
other players, and so we allow for the state weighting matrices Qi to be indeﬁnite.
This is in contrast with the bulk of the control literature, in which the state weighting
matrix is assumed to be positive deﬁnite. Allowing the matrices Qi to be indeﬁnite
brings considerable technical complications, but we believe that in the multi-player
context this generality is natural. In particular we are able in this way to formulate
two-person games that are zero-sum as far as the state variable is concerned. On
the other hand, the term uT
i (t)Riiui(t) is interpreted as a measure of the eﬀort
expended by player i,a n ds ow el e tRii be positive deﬁn i t e . H e r ew es t a yi nl i n e
with standard control theory.5 Under our assumption that the players use constant











where Fi is the feedback chosen by player i. Written in the above form, the criterion
may be looked at as a function of the initial condition x0 and the state feedbacks
Fi.
The description of the players’ objectives given above needs to be modiﬁed in
order to express a desire for robustness. Here we consider two alternatives, which
5We note though that for some problems (where the control weighting term is not interpreted
as spent energy) it may be natural to let the matrix Rii be indeﬁnite. It has been shown recently
in a stochastic context that the resulting control problem may still be well-posed (Ref. 3). Here
we do not consider this generalization, however.
4both are well known in control theory. The ﬁrst alternative consists of modifying
the criterion (3) to
¯ J
SC




Ji(F1,···,F N,w,x 0)( 4 )
where









j RijFj)x − w
TViw}dt. (5)
The weighting matrix Vi is symmetric and positive deﬁnite for all i =1 ,...,N.
Because it occurs with a minus sign in (5), this matrix constrains the disturbance
vector w in an indirect way so that it can be used to describe the aversion to model
risk of player i.S p e c i ﬁcally, if the quantity wTViw is large for a vector w ∈ Rq,t h i s
means that player i does not expect large deviations of the nominal dynamics in
the direction of Ew. In most of the paper we use this so-called “soft-constrained”
formulation, which has been used extensively in control theory. Note that since we
do not assume positive deﬁniteness of the state weighting matrix, our development
extends even in the one-player case the standard results that may be found for
instance in Refs. 2, 4, 5, 6 (Section 20.2), 7, 8 (Section 6.6).
We also spend attention on a second way of describing aversion to model risk:
again a minmax problem is solved, but the disturbance is not restrained by a cost
term but simply by a direct norm bound. This formulation is sometimes referred to
as the disturbance attenuation problem, or the problem with hard-bounded uncer-
tainty; see Refs. 2 and 9. In control theory (see for instance Ref. 5), this problem is
usually considered for a zero initial state. Here we carry out an analysis allowing a
nonzero initial state, extending earlier results by Ref. 9 to the inﬁnite-horizon and
multiple-player context.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section considers
some preliminaries. Section 3 treats the soft-constrained case whereas Section 4
considers the hard-bounded case. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
The following notations and terminologies will be used throughout this paper.
- To indicate that a symmetric matrix P is positive (semi) deﬁnite, we write
P>0( P ≥ 0).
- Given a positive deﬁnite matrix P of size n×n,t h eP-norm of a vector a ∈ Rn
is denoted by kakP := (aTPa)1/2.
- For an N-tuple γ =( γ1,...,γN) ∈ Γ1 × ...ΓN for given sets Γi,w ew r i t e
γ−i(α): =( γ1,...,γi−1,α,γi+1,...,γN), with α ∈ Γi.
-W eu s e
PN
i6=j ai as an abbreviation for a1 + ···+ aj−1 + aj+1 + ···+ aN.
5-T h es p a c eo fI Rk-valued functions that are quadratically integrable on (0,∞)
is denoted by Lk
2(0,∞). With the usual inner product and induced norm, we
denote the norm of a vector v ∈ Lk
2(0,∞)b ykvk.
-A m a t r i x A is called stable if all its eigenvalues are in the open left-half complex
plane.
- For matrices A and Bi, i =1 ,...,N,t h es e tFN is deﬁned by



















- Consider the algebraic Riccati equation
Q + A
TX + XA+ XPX =0 ( A R E )
where Q and P are symmetric. A symmetric solution X is called a stabilizing
solution of (ARE) if A + PX i s s t a b l e .I t i s w e l l - k n o w n ( s e e e . g .R e f .7 ,
Theorem 13.5) that if such a solution exists, it is unique.
3 Soft-Constrained Nash Equilibria
The robust equilibrium concepts to be introduced in this and the next section are
both inspired by the game-theoretic approach to H∞ control theory. In that theory
the uncertainty in a system is expressed by an additive disturbance term in the
diﬀerential equation. As outlined in the introduction we take a similar approach in
an N-player context, i.e. we consider the diﬀerential equation
˙ x = Ax +
N X
i=1
Biui + Ew, x(0) = x0 (6)
where w ∈ L
q
2(0,∞) represents the unknown disturbance. We assume that the
information structure of the players is a feedback pattern and that they are restricted
to linear time-invariant stabilizing strategies, i.e. their control functions are of the
form
ui = Fix, (F1,...,F N) ∈ FN. (7)
As motivated in the introduction we consider in this section the cost functions (4).
These adjusted cost functions do not depend on the disturbance term. They only
depend on the strategies and the initial state. According to the feedback informa-
tion structure a set of equilibrium strategies should be independent of the initial
state. Furthermore, the strategies should satisfy the usual equilibrium inequalities.
6A formal deﬁnition is given below.
Deﬁnition 3.1
An N-tuple ¯ F =(¯ F1,..., ¯ FN) ∈ FN is called a soft-constrained Nash equilibrium if
for each i =1 ,...,N the following inequality holds:
¯ J
SC
i ( ¯ F,x0) ≤ ¯ J
SC
i ( ¯ F−i(F),x 0)( 8 )
for all x0 ∈ I Rn and for all F ∈ I Rmi×n that satisfy ¯ F−i(F) ∈ FN. ¤
In the next subsection we will discuss the one-player case. The results obtained
for that particular case are the basis for the derivation of results for the general
N-player case. We stress here the point again that in contrast to the usual H∞-
approach (see e.g. Ref. 5) we consider a cost criterion without assuming the state
weighting matrix to be positive semideﬁnite. The general N-player case is dealt
with in Subsection 3.2. In Subsection 3.3 we treat the scalar case in more detail.
3.1 One-Player Case
In this subsection we study the one-player case, i.e. we consider
˙ x =( A + BF)x + Ew, x(0) = x0, (9)








The matrices Q,R and V are symmetric, R>0, and V> 0. The problem is to








Furthermore, if the inﬁmum is ﬁnite, it is of interest to determine whether there is a
feedback matrix ¯ F ∈ F that achieves the inﬁmum, and to determine all matrices that
have this property. This soft-constrained diﬀerential game can also be interpreted
as a model for a situation where the controller designer is minimizing the criterion
(10) by choosing an appropriate F ∈ F, while the uncertainty is maximizing the
same criterion by choosing an appropriate w ∈ L
q
2(0,∞).
A necessary condition for the expression in (11) to be ﬁnite is that the supremum
supw∈L
q
2(0,∞) J(F,w,x0)i sﬁnite for at least one F ∈ F. This condition is not suﬃ-
cient (see Remark 3.1 (iii) below). We now ﬁrst present a lemma that gives necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for the supremum in (11) to attain a ﬁnite value for a given
stabilizing feedback matrix F. The lemma will be used later on in Theorem 3.1,
which provides a suﬃcient condition under which the soft-constrained diﬀerential
game associated to (9)—(10) has a saddle point.
7Lemma 3.1 Let A be stable. Consider the system
˙ x = Ax + Ew (12)






TVw)dt, x(0) = x0,
with Q = QT and V> 0. Let M := EV −1ET. The following conditions are
equivalent.
(i) For each x0 ∈ I Rn there exists a ¯ w ∈ L
q
2(0,∞)s u c ht h a tφ(w,x0) ≤ φ(¯ w,x0).






has no eigenvalues on the imaginary axis.
(iii) The algebraic Riccati equation
Q + A
TX + XA+ XMX = 0 (13)
has a stabilizing solution (see (ARE)).





where X is the stabilizing solution of (13). Furthermore we have φ(¯ w,x0)=xT
0Xx0.
Proof We will show the following implications: (i) ⇒ (ii) ⇒ (iii) ⇒ (i). The
second part of the lemma follows from the proof that (iii) implies (i).
(i) ⇒ (ii): Denote the state trajectory corresponding to ¯ w by ¯ x. Then the maximum
principle (see e.g. Ref. 10) implies that there exists a costate variable p such that
˙ ¯ x = A¯ x + E ¯ w, ¯ x(0) = x0
˙ p = −Q¯ x − A
Tp
¯ w(t)=a r gm a x
w∈I Rq(¯ x
TQ¯ x − w
TVw+2 p
T(A¯ x + Ew)).
A completion of squares shows that
−w
TVw+2 p
TEw = −(w − V
−1E
Tp)






















, ¯ x(0) = x0.
8Since ¯ w ∈ L
q
2(0,∞)a n dA is stable, ¯ x(t) → 0 for t →∞for all x0 ∈ I Rn.T h i s
shows that the spectral subspace corresponding to the eigenvalues in the open left-
half plane has at least dimension n.S i n c eH is an Hamiltonian matrix this implies
that H has no eigenvalues on the imaginary axis.
(ii) ⇒ (iii): This implication follows from e.g. Ref. 7, Theorem 13.6.
(iii) ⇒ (i): Let w ∈ L
q
2(0,∞)a n dx be generated by (12). Since A is stable we have

























Hence φ(w,x0) ≤ xT
0Xx0 and equality holds if and only if w = V −1ETXx.S u b s t i -
tuting this in (12) shows that φ(·,x 0) is uniquely maximized by ¯ w. ¤
Remark 3.1
(i) Note that the lemma does not imply that if the Hamiltonian matrix H has
eigenvalues on the imaginary axis, the cost will be unbounded. Consider e.g.
a = −1;q = r = e = v =1 .T h e nX = 1 is the unique (though not stabilizing) so-
lution of (13). A completion of squares (see proof above) shows that φ(w,x0) ≤ x2
0.
Furthermore, it is easily veriﬁed that with w =( 1− ε)x, for an arbitrarily small
positive ε, we can approach this cost arbitrarily closely.
(ii) From the above example we also immediately learn that if there exists a ¯ F ∈ F
such that supw∈L
q
2(0,∞) J(F,w,x0)i sﬁnite, this does not imply that there is an open
neighborhood of ¯ F ∈ F for which the supremum is also ﬁnite. Take e.g. a = −1
2, b =
1
2, ¯ f = −1, q = r = e = v = 1. Then for every ε > 0, supw∈L
q
2(0,∞) J(( ¯ f + ε),w,x 0)
is inﬁnite.
(iii) Since we did not assume that the state weighting Q in (10) is nonnegative def-
inite, it may well happen that the value of the expression in (11) is −∞.F o r a
simple example, consider the scalar case with E =0 ,A = −1, B = R = V =1 ,a n d
Q = −2. ¤
Motivated by this result we deﬁne for each F ∈ F the Hamiltonian matrix
HF :=
µ
A + BF M
−Q − F TRF −(A + BF)T
¶
. (14)
and introduce the set
¯ F := {F ∈ F|HF has no eigenvalues on the imaginary axis}. (15)
The following lemma provides a convenient expression for the objective function of
t h eg a m et h a tw ec o n s i d e r .
9Lemma 3.2 Consider (9)—(10) with F ∈ F and w ∈ L
q
2(0,∞). Let X be an








TX + XA− XSX + XMX)x










where S := BR−1BT and M := EV −1ET.
Proof Since F ∈ F and w ∈ L
q























































show that (16) holds. ¤
The above lemma shows that if X satisﬁes the algebraic Riccati equation (18) below,
an optimal choice for the minimizing player is −R−1BTX, which is an admissible
choice if X is the stabilizing solution of this equation. If the maximizing player
would be restricted to choose linear state feedback matrices as well, his optimal
choice would be the state feedback matrix V −1ETX. The following theorem shows
that under the open-loop information structure, the optimal choice for the maxi-
mizing player, given that the minimizing player chooses −R−1BTX, can indeed be
obtained from the feedback law x → V −1ETXx. This theorem provides a set of suf-
ﬁcient conditions for a saddlepoint solution to exist. Consequently, it also generates
a solution of problem (11).
To motivate the conditions in the theorem, consider for the moment the scalar
case, without going into too much detail. We replace the upper case symbols for
matrices by their lower case equivalents to emphasize that these matrices are now
just real numbers. Under the assumption that the conditions of Lemma 3.1 are
satisﬁed, the equation (cf. (13))
mx
2 +2 ( a + bf)x +2 fr= 0 (17)
holds for each f, and we have supw∈L
q
2(0,∞) J(f,w,x0)=x(f)x2
0. In particular, the
minimizing ¯ f satisﬁes x0( ¯ f)=0 .D i ﬀerentiation of (17) with respect to f then yields
10that ¯ f = −bx/r. Substitution of this relationship into (17) shows that x should be
a stabilizing solution of (m − s)x2 +2 ax + q = 0 (see (18)). On the other hand, to
guarantee that ¯ f indeed yields a minimum, the condition −a/b 6∈ ¯ F suﬃces; this is
equivalent to a2 + qs > 0. This requirement is the scalar version of condition (19)
below.
Theorem 3.1 Consider (9)—(10) and let the matrices S and M be deﬁned as in
Lemma 3.2. Assume that the algebraic Riccati equation
Q + A
TX + XA− XSX + XMX = 0 (18)
has a stabilizing solution X and that additionally A − SX is stable. Furthermore,
assume that there exists a real symmetric n × n symmetric matrix Y that satisﬁes
the matrix inequality
Q + A
TY + YA− YSY ≥ 0. (19)
Deﬁne ¯ F := −R−1BTX and ¯ w(t): =V −1ETXet(A−SX+MX)x0. Then the matrix ¯ F
belongs to ¯ F,t h ef u n c t i o n¯ w is in L
q




J( ¯ F,w,x0) ≤ J( ¯ F, ¯ w,x0) ≤ J(F, ¯ w,x0).
Moreover, J( ¯ F, ¯ w,x0)=xT
0Xx0.
Proof The matrices A − SX and A − SX + MX are stable by assumption,
which implies that ¯ F ∈ F and ¯ w ∈ L
q







(k(F − ¯ F)xk
2


















where ˜ x is generated by ˙ ˜ x =( A+B ¯ F)˜ x+Ew, ˜ x(0) = x0. Furthermore, if J( ¯ F,w,x0)=
xT
0Xx0 then w =¯ w.H e n c eJ( ¯ F,w,x0) <x T
0Xx0 for all w 6=¯ w,a n dJ( ¯ F, ¯ w,x0)=
xT
0Xx0. This, obviously, implies also that ¯ F ∈ ¯ F.
Next, we show that J(F, ¯ w,x0) ≥ J( ¯ F, ¯ w,x0) for all F ∈ F.L e tˆ x and ¯ x be
generated by
˙ ˆ x =( A + BF)ˆ x + E ¯ w, ˆ x(0) = x0
and
˙ ¯ x =( A + B ¯ F)¯ x + E ¯ w, ¯ x(0) = x0
respectively. Deﬁne furthermore
ν := ( ¯ F − F)ˆ x, ζ := ¯ w − V
−1E
TXˆ x.




V)dt. Introducing ξ := ¯ x − ˆ x we
have that
˙ ξ =( A + B ¯ F)ξ + Bν (20)
with ξ(0) = 0, and ζ = V −1ETXξ.S i n c eb o t hˆ x and ¯ x belong to Ln
2(0,∞)i tf o l l o w s
that ξ and ν are quadratically integrable as well, which implies that ξ(t) → 0 for




dtξTXξdt =0 . Hence







































Next, deﬁne w := ν + ¯ Fξ = ¯ F¯ x − Fˆ x. Then, (20) shows that ˙ ξ = Aξ + Bw. Since
ξ(0) = 0 and ξ(t) → 0f o rt →∞we also have
R ∞
0 ( d
dtξTY ξ)dt =0 . Hence


















TY ξ + ξ
T(Q + A










TY + YA− YSY)ξ)dt ≥ 0
where the last inequality follows by assumption. ¤
Note that if Q ≥ 0, condition (19) is trivially satisﬁed by choosing Y =0 . T h e
following corollary summarizes the consequences of Theorem 3.1 for the problem
posed at the beginning of this subsection.
Corollary 3.1 Let the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 hold and let X, ¯ F,a n d¯ w



























The rest of this section is concerned with the question to what extent it is nec-
essary for the expression (11) to be ﬁnite that the algebraic Riccati equation (18)
12has a symmetric solution such that both A + MX − SX and A − SX are stable.
The theorem below shows that this condition must hold if the inﬁmum in (11) is
achieved at some ¯ F ∈ ¯ F.












Then the algebraic Riccati equation (18) has a stabilizing solution X. Furthermore,
the matrix A − SX is stable.
Proof From the assumption it follows that ¯ F ∈ F is such that the Hamiltonian
matrix H ¯ F deﬁned in (14) has no eigenvalues on the imaginary axis. This implies
that there is an open neighborhood O ¯ F ⊂ F of ¯ F such that for all F ∈ O ¯ F, HF has
no eigenvalues on the imaginary axis. Let F ∈ O ¯ F be an arbitrary element. This
implies that 3.1.(ii) holds with A, Q and φ(w,x0) replaced by A + BF, Q + F TRF
and J(F,w,x0), respectively. Hence, according to this lemma







where ψ : O ¯ F → I Rn×n is deﬁned by ψ(F): =X,w h e r eX is the stabilizing solution
of
Q + F
TRF +( A + BF)
TX + X(A + BF)+XMX =0 .
In Ref. 6, Section 11.3, it is shown that the maximal solution of
˜ X(µ) ˜ D(µ) ˜ X(µ) − ˜ X(µ) ˜ A(µ) − ˜ A
T(µ) ˜ X(µ) − ˜ C(µ) = 0 (23)
is a real-analytic function of k real variables µ ∈ Ω,w h e r eΩ is an open connected
set in I Rk if (i) ˜ A(µ), ˜ C(µ)a n d ˜ D(µ) are real-analytic functions of µ,( i i ) ˜ D(µ) ≥ 0,
(iii) ( ˜ A(µ), ˜ D(µ)) is stabilizable, and (iv) the matrix
µ
− ˜ A(µ) ˜ D(µ)
˜ C(µ) ˜ AT(µ)
¶
has no eigenvalues on the imaginary axis for all µ ∈ Ω. Under the conditions (ii)
and (iii), the maximal solution of (23) coincides with the unique solution of (23) for
which the spectrum of ˜ A(µ) − ˜ D(µ) ˜ X(µ) lies in the closed left-half plane (see e.g.
Ref. 6, Theorem 7.9.3). Note that −X is the maximal solution of (23) with
˜ A(µ)=A + BF, ˜ C(µ)=−Q − F
TRF, ˜ D(µ)=M and µ =v e cF
(vecF denotes the vector obtained from F by stacking the columns of F). Clearly,
condition (i) and (ii) hold; condition (iii) follows from the stability of A + BF and
condition (iv) follows from the easily veriﬁable fact that the matrices HF and
µ
−A − BF M
−Q − F TRF (A + BF)T
¶
13have the same spectrum. Hence, ψ is an analytic function of F in any open connected
subset of ¯ F. In particular ¯ J is diﬀerentiable with respect to F in such a set. Since ¯ J
attains its minimum at ¯ F ∈ F, for each x0 ∈ I Rn,ad i ﬀerentiation argument shows
(see Ref. 11 for details) that the Fr´ echet derivative ∂ψ( ¯ F)=0 . Next, deﬁne the
transformation Ψ : ¯ F×I Rn×n → I Rn×n by
Ψ(F,X): =Q + F
TRF +( A + BF)
TX + X(A + BF)+XMX.
By deﬁnition, we have Ψ(F,ψ(F)) = 0 for all F ∈ O ¯ F. Taking the derivative of this
equality at F = ¯ F shows that ¯ F = −R−1BTψ( ¯ F) (see again Ref. 11 for details).
Substituting this in Ψ( ¯ F,ψ( ¯ F)) = 0 yields
Q + A
Tψ( ¯ F)+ψ( ¯ F)A − ψ( ¯ F)Sψ( ¯ F)+ψ( ¯ F)Mψ( ¯ F)=0 .
This shows that ψ( ¯ F)s a t i s ﬁes (18) and furthermore, since it is the stabilizing solu-
tion of the equation Ψ( ¯ F,X) = 0 it follows that A+B ¯ F +Mψ( ¯ F)=A−Sψ( ¯ F)+
Mψ( ¯ F) is stable. Finally, since ¯ F ∈ ¯ F, the matrix A − Sψ( ¯ F)i ss t a b l e . ¤
3.2 N-Player Case
From Corollary 3.1, a suﬃcient condition for the existence of a soft-constrained feed-
back Nash equilibrium follows in a straightforward way.
Theorem 3.3 Consider the diﬀerential game deﬁned by (1), (4) and (5). Assume
there exist N real symmetric n×n matrices Xi and N real symmetric n×n matrices
Yi such that
Qi + A
TXi + XiA −
N X
j6=i












SjXj is stable (26)
Qi + A
TYi + YiA −
N X
j6=i
(YiSjXj + XjSjYi) − YiSiYi +
N X
j6=i
XjSijXj ≥ 0. (27)
Deﬁne the N-tuple ¯ F =(¯ F1,..., ¯ FN)b y





Then ¯ F ∈ FN,a n dt h i sN-tuple is a soft-constrained Nash equilibrium. Furthermore
¯ J
SC
i ( ¯ F1,..., ¯ FN,x 0)=x
T
0Xix0. (29)
14Proof The assumption (26) immediately implies that ¯ F ∈ FN.L e tx0 ∈ I Rn and
1 ≤ i ≤ N. Let the functional φ be deﬁned by
φ : {F ∈ I R
mi×n | ¯ F−i(F) ∈ FN
ª
→ I R, φ(F)= ¯ J
SC
i ( ¯ F−i(F),x 0).
We need to show that this functional is minimal at F = ¯ Fi.W eh a v e




























x + Ew, x(0) = x0.
Note that the functional φ coincides with the functional J,a sd e ﬁned in Theo-
rem 3.1, with A replaced by A −
PN
j6=i SjXj, B := Bi, Q := Qi +
PN
j6=i XjSijXj,
R := Rii, V = Vi, and the same values for E and x0. It is easily seen that the
conditions (24)—(27) guarantee that the conditions of Theorem 3.1 are satisﬁed with




i Xi = ¯ Fi, and the minimal value is equal to xT
0Xix0. ¤
Remark 3.2 If Qi ≥ 0f o ra l li =1 ,...,N, the matrix inequality (27) is triv-
ially satisﬁed with Yi =0 . ¤
3.3 Scalar Case
In this subsection we consider the scalar case of the one-player problem (9)—(10) in
some more detail. Speciﬁcally we are interested in the meaning of condition (19)
which plays a role only when the state weighting matrix in the objective function is
indeﬁnite. First we obtain necessary and suﬃcient conditions for







to be ﬁnite. We begin with necessary and suﬃcient conditions under which the
supremum takes a ﬁnite value.
Lemma 3.3 Let f ∈ F be ﬁxed. Then supw∈L
q
2(0,∞) J(f,w,x0)i sﬁnite if and
only if g(f): =( a+bf)2−m(q+f2r) ≥ 0. Furthermore, the value of the supremum
is −1
2(q + f2r)x2




Proof If e = 0, the supremum is achieved at w =0a n ds oi ti sﬁnite for any
f ∈ F.I nt h i sc a s ew ea l s oh a v em = e2/v = 0 and so the condition of the lemma
holds. If e 6=0 ,t h ep a i r( a + bf,e) is controllable. Using Ref. 12 (or, in this scalar
15case, elementary analysis), we have that the supremum is ﬁnite if and only if the
algebraic Riccati equation
mx
2 +2 ( a + bf)x + q + f
2r = 0 (31)
has a real solution. Furthermore, the value of the supremum is x2
0xs,w h e r exs is the
smallest solution of (31). From this, the above statement follows directly. ¤
Next, we consider the outer minimization. From the above lemma it is clear that
the case e = 0 is a special one. Therefore, we analyse this case ﬁrst.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that in the scalar version of (9)—(10) we have e =0 ,
and write t := a2 + sq.I fb 6= 0, the following holds.




t and ¯ f = −(a + t)/b.
(ii) If t =0 ,t h e n¯ J = a/s and the inﬁmum in problem (30) is not achieved
(actually, the inﬁmum is attained at f = −a/b).
(iii) If t<0, then ¯ J = −∞.
If b = 0, then necessarily a<0 and the minimum ¯ J = −q/(2a) is attained at f =0 .
Proof All statements follow by an elementary analysis of the function F3f 7→
−1
2(q+f2r)/(a+bf) (see Lemma 3.3). If t>0 this function has a unique minimum
at ¯ f;i ft = 0 its graph is a line; if t<0 it is a monotonic function that has a vertical
asymptote at f = −a/b. ¤
Next, consider the case e 6=0o r ,e q u i v a l e n t l y ,m 6=0 .L e t
¯ Fe := {f ∈ F|g(f)=( a + bf)
2 − m(q + f
2r) ≥ 0} (32)
(see Lemma 3.3). That is, ¯ Fe is the set of all stabilizing feedback matrices for which
supw∈L
q
2(0,∞) J(f,w,x0)i sﬁnite. From Lemma 3.3 we know that the supremum
equals x2
0xs(f), where xs(f)i sg i v e nb y
xs(f)=−





We are looking for the minimum of xs(f)o v e ra l lf in the set ¯ Fe. To perform this
minimization we ﬁrst consider the domain ¯ Fe in some more detail.
Lemma 3.4 The set ¯ Fe deﬁned in (32) is either
-e m p t y ,
- a single point,
-ah a l ﬂine,
16- a bounded interval, or
- the union of a halﬂine and a bounded interval.
Proof Deﬁne G := {f | (a + bf)2 − m(q + f2r) ≥ 0}.T h e n¯ Fe = G ∩ F.N o t e
that F is an open halﬂine. To determine G, we consider the graph of g(f): =
(a + bf)2 − m(q + f2r),f ∈ I R.I f g is concave, G is a (possibly empty) closed
interval or just a single point. So ¯ Fe is a (possibly empty) interval or single point
too. In case g is convex, G consists of either the whole real line or the union of two
closed halﬂines. From this the other possibilities mentioned in the lemma are easily
established. ¤
From this lemma we conclude that whenever ¯ Fe is not empty or consists of a single
point, we can use diﬀerentiation arguments to investigate the ﬁniteness of ¯ J.T h e r e -
fore, we ﬁrst analyse these two cases.
Proposition 3.2
(I.) ¯ Fe = ∅ if and only if s<mand either i) a2+q(s−m) < 0o ri i )a2+q(s−m) ≥ 0;
a ≥ 0; and a2 + qs ≥ 0. In this case, ¯ J = ∞.
(II.) ¯ Fe consists of only one point if and only if simultaneously s−m<0, a2+q(s−
m) = 0, and −ma/(s−m) < 0h o l d .T h e n , ¯ J = a/(s−m)a n d ¯ f = −ab/(r(s−m)).
Proof
(I.) ¯ Fe = ∅ if and only if (see Lemma 3.4) either G is empty, or the intersection
of F with G (with G a bounded interval) is empty. The ﬁrst case occurs if both
s − m<0a n da2 + q(s − m) < 0. The second case occurs if s − m<0; a2 +
q(s − m) ≥ 0 and (assume without loss of generality b>0) −a/b ≤− (ab/r + p
m/r
p
a2 + q(s − m))/(s − m). This holds if and only if a ≥ 0a n da2 + qs ≥ 0.
(II.) ¯ Fe consists of only one point if and only if g(f) = 0 has exact one solution in
F. Elementary calculations then show the stated result. ¤
T h en e x tc a s ew ec o n s i d e ri sG = I R. This corresponds to the case s>mand
a2 + q(s − m) ≤ 0. It can be shown that under these conditions the derivative of
xs(f) is negative. So, the inﬁmum is ﬁnite, but is attained at the boundary of F.
From this and Proposition 3.2 we see that the only case for which a2+q(s−m) ≤ 0
we did not treat yet is the case s = m. Obviously, this case only occurs if a =0 .I t
is easily veriﬁed that x0
s(f) < 0 again, so the same conclusion as above holds.
Finally, consider the case that a2 + q(s − m) > 0. Elementary calculations
show that in that case the derivative of xs(f) has a unique zero f∗.T h i s z e r o
coincides with −(b/r)x∗,w h e r ex∗ is the smallest solution of the algebraic Riccati
equation (18). Furthermore, y00
f(f∗) < 0, so xs(f) has a minimum at f∗.M o r e o v e r ,
g(f∗)=( a − sx∗ + mx∗)2 ≥ 0. So, f∗ ∈ G. If additionally a − sx∗ ∈ F,t h e nxs(f)
has a minimum in ¯ Fe which, moreover, is a global minimum if e.g. ¯ Fe is connected.
On the other hand it is clear that if a−sx∗ 6∈ F the inﬁmum value is again attained
17at the boundary of F. The following example illustrates the case in which ¯ Fe is not
connected.
Example 3.1 Let a =5 ,b =1 ,m =1 ,r = 1
9 and q = −3. Then, ¯ Fe =( −∞,−6)∪
(−51




0, f∗ = −63
4 and J(f∗, ¯ w,x0)=3
4x2
0.
In this case the inﬁmum is not achieved. Note that if f = −5t h ew o r s tc a s ea c t i o n
(from the player’s point of view) the disturbance can take is to stabilize the system
since the player’s aim is to maximize the revenues x (subject to the constraint that
the undisturbed closed-loop system must be stable). ¤
The next lemma gives conditions, in terms of the problem parameters, under which
a nonempty set ¯ Fe is not connected.
Lemma 3.5 Assume that ¯ Fe 6= ∅.T h e n¯ Fe is not connected if and only if the
following four conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) s − m>0
(ii) a2 + q(s − m) ≥ 0
(iii) a2 + qs < 0
(iv) a>0.
Proof If g is concave (see proof of Lemma 3.4), the set ¯ Fe is an interval and is thus
connected. It is easily veriﬁed that this situation occurs if and only if s − m ≤ 0.
Next consider the case that g is convex. If g has no zeros it is obvious that
¯ Fe is connected. This occurs if and only if a2 +( s − m)q<0. Otherwise,
G =( −∞,a 0) ∪ (a1,∞). Then, ¯ Fe is connected if and only if (assume without
loss of generality b>0) −a/b ≤− (ab +
p
a2b2 − (a2 − mq)(b2 − mr))/(r(s − m)).
This condition holds if and only if either a ≤ 0o ra2 + qs ≥ 0. ¤
If ¯ Fe is not connected, J(f, ¯ w(f),x 0) does not have a global minimum since












Actually one can show that xs(f) attains again an inﬁmum at −a/b.S ow ec o n c l u d e
the following.
Theorem 3.4 Consider the scalar version of the one-player game (9)—(10). As-
sume that the set ¯ Fe deﬁned in (32) has more than one element and that e 6=0 ;
then the following statements hold.
(i) The one-player game has a solution if and only if either one of the four condi-
tions in Lemma 3.5 is violated and (18) has a stabilizing solution x∗ for which
additionally a−sx∗ is stable. In that case the solution is provided by Theorem
3.1.




Remark 3.3 The assumption that there exists a number y such that q+2ay−sy2 ≥ 0
(see Theorem 3.1) is equivalent to the assumption that a2 + qs ≥ 0. So, this condi-
tion indeed implies in the scalar case that ¯ Fe is connected. ¤
We end this subsection by noting that for the two-player case one can study the
number of solutions to the algebraic Riccati equations like in Ref. 13. Rewriting
mi =: αisi for some positive αi, and using the same notation, one has to study the
solution set of the following (in)equalities:
(1 + αi)κ2
i − 2κ3κi + σi =0 ,i =1 ,2 (34)
κ3 := −a + κ1 + κ2 > 0 (35)
κ3 − αiκi > 0,i =1 ,2. (36)
Equations (34)—(35) can be analysed similarly as in Ref. 13. By taking αi small it
is clear that the number of equilibria can vary again between zero and three.
Another interesting point is that the incorporation of noise by players into their
decision making may result in the fact that a situation of no equilibrium changes
into a situation in which an equilibrium does exist. Take e.g. qi = −1; bi = ri = vi =
e =1a n da = −3
2. For these parameters the undisturbed game has no equilibrium
(see Ref. 13, Theorem 3) whereas the disturbed game has the equilibrium κi = −1
2,
i =1 ,2; κ3 = 1
2.
Furthermore, using the implicit function theorem, one can analyse the conse-
quences of a change in the αi parameters on the equilibrium location. Assuming
that the equilibrium (κ∗
1,κ∗



















where pi := κ∗
3−αiκ∗
i > 0 (see (36)). From this it is immediately clear, for example,
that at a positive equilibrium an increase in α1 will have an opposite eﬀect on the
entries of the equilibrium location. One entry will increase, the other will decrease.
That is, the response to a more risk-averse behavior by one player is a more risk-
seeking behavior by the other player. We do not undertake a more detailed analysis
here since such an analysis can be carried out best in the context of a speciﬁc
application.
4 Hard-Bounded Nash Equilibria
In this section we consider again the system
˙ x = Ax +
N X
i=1
Biui + Ew, x(0) = x0, (37)
19with strategies


















In the hard-bounded modeling approach we consider as objective functions for the
players the adjusted cost functions
¯ J
HB




i (F1,...,F N,w,x 0). (40)
The numbers ri express the players’ degrees of aversion against model risk; in this
sense their role is similar to that of the matrices Vi in the soft-constrained problem
given by the objective functions (5).
Deﬁnition 4.1 An N-tuple ¯ F =(¯ F1,..., ¯ FN) ∈ FN is called a hard-bounded Nash
equilibrium if for each i =1 ,...,N the following inequality holds:
¯ J
HB
i ( ¯ F,x0) ≤ ¯ J
HB
i ( ¯ F−i(F),x 0) (41)
for all F ∈ I Rmi×n that satisfy ¯ F−i(F) ∈ FN. ¤
Note that here, in contrast to Section 3, players have a memoryless perfect state in-
formation structure (see Ref. 8), so that the linear stabilizing feedback control may
depend on the initial state. A suﬃcient condition for the existence of hard-bounded
Nash equilibria is presented in Theorem 4.2 below. We present ﬁrst a result on a
minmax problem, corresponding to a one-player situation, on which the proof of
the theorem will be based. For x0 = 0, the minmax problem reduces to the state
feedback H∞ control problem. For nonzero unknown initial state, the corresponding
maxmin problem has been studied in Ref. 15. Here we study the minmax problem
with known x0 6= 0, i.e. we study the worst-case disturbance attenuation problem
with known nonzero initial state. The problem addressed here is a direct general-
ization of Ref. 9.
Theorem 4.1 Let r>0, x0 ∈ I Rn, A,Q ∈ I Rn×n, B ∈ I Rn×m, E ∈ I Rn×q,




F := {F ∈ I R
m×n | A + BF is stable}. (43)
Assume there exists a real symmetric n × n matrix X,a nn × n matrix P,a n da
20real number γ 6=0 ,s u c ht h a t
X ≥ 0 (44)
Q + A
TX + XA− XSX + γ
−2XEE
TX = 0 (45)
A0 := A − SX + γ
−2EE
TX is stable (46)
A
T







Deﬁne ¯ F := −R−1BTX.T h e n¯ F ∈ F and the functional J : F → I R,d e ﬁned by







where x follows from
˙ x =( A + BF)x + Ew, x(0) = x0, (50)
is minimal at F = ¯ F. Furthermore, the corresponding minimal value is equal to
xT
0Xx0 + γ2r2.
Proof Note that the matrix X is the stabilizing solution of the ARE (45). Since X
is positive semideﬁnite, it follows from Ref. 7, Lemma 16.6, that A − SX is stable.
Hence ¯ F ∈ F.N e x t ,d e ﬁne the functional φ : F×L
q



































0Px 0 = r
2.
Next, we will show that6
φ( ¯ F,w) ≤ φ( ¯ F, ¯ w) ≤ φ(F, ¯ w) (52)
6The set of inequalities (52) is equivalent to stating that the pair ( ¯ F, ¯ w) is a saddlepoint solution
of the zero-sum game with minimization set F, maximization set {w ∈ L
q
2(0,∞)|k wk ≤ r},a n d
objective function φ (see for instance Ref. 5, Chapter 2, for a brief overview of zero-sum game
theory).
21for all F ∈ F and for all w ∈ L
q
2(0,∞)w i t hkwk ≤ r.I n o r d e r t o p r o v e t h e s e


























k(F − ¯ F)xk
2





Here we used the fact that x(t) → 0a st →∞ , which holds because x, ˙ x ∈ Ln
2(0,∞)
(see for instance Ref. 15, Exercise 6.10). From (53) we deduce








where ¯ x is deﬁned by ˙ ¯ x =( A + B ¯ F)¯ x + E ¯ w and ¯ x(0) = x0. From this and (51), it
is easily seen that ¯ w = γ−2ETX¯ x.T h u s





Furthermore, from (53) we also deduce for each w ∈ L
q
2(0,∞)w i t hkwk ≤ r that




2 = φ( ¯ F, ¯ w)
which is the ﬁrst inequality in (52). In order to show the second inequality, we
introduce the variables ¯ xw, ν, ζ,a n dξ by
˙ ¯ xw =( A + BF)¯ xw + E ¯ w, ¯ xw(0) = x0
ν := ( ¯ F − F)¯ xw
ζ := ¯ w − γ
−2E
TX¯ xw
ξ := ¯ x − ¯ xw.
Then, (53) and (54) imply that


















It is easily seen that ˙ ξ =( A + B ¯ F)ξ + Bν, ξ(0) = 0, and ξ(t) → 0f o rt →∞ ,s o
that a completion of the squares yields



























22Since Q is positive semideﬁnite, this expression is clearly nonnegative. This com-
pletes the proof of the second inequality in (52). The inequalities (52) imply
J( ¯ F)= s u p
kwk≤r
φ( ¯ F,w)=φ( ¯ F, ¯ w) ≤ φ(F, ¯ w) ≤ sup
kwk≤r
φ(F,w)=J(F).
This shows that the functional J is minimal at F = ¯ F. The last part of the theorem
immediately follows from (54). ¤
Remark 4.1 The ARE (45) also appears in the context of H∞ control theory, see
e.g. Refs. 5, 7, 16 or 17. It is well-known that under the additional assumption that
(A,Q1/2) has no unobservable eigenvalues on the imaginary axis, a positive number
γ∗ exists such that there exists a unique real symmetric n × n matrix X satisfying
(44)—(46) if and only if γ > γ∗. Hence, for each γ > γ∗, one can determine a matrix
X from (44)—(46). Equation (47) is a Lyapunov equation and since the matrix A0
is stable, a unique matrix P can easily be determined from this equation. Equation
(48) requires a bit more care. Under some weak conditions, it can be shown that
the function γ 7→ γ−4xT
0Px 0 is strictly decreasing in γ for γ > γ∗. Furthermore,
the expression γ−4xT
0Px 0 typically approaches inﬁnity in the limit γ ↓ γ∗.T h u si n
principle it is straightforward to construct a numerical scheme producing a triple
(X,P,γ) satisfying (44)—(48). For a further discussion of these aspects we refer to
Ref. 11, Section 6.3. ¤
On the basis of the one-player results derived above, the theorem below follows
rather straightforwardly.
Theorem 4.2 Let Qi ≥ 0 for each i =1 ,...,N. Assume there exist N real
symmetric n × n matrices Xi, N symmetric n × n matrices Pi,a n dN nonzero real
numbers γi,s u c ht h a t
Xi ≥ 0 (55)
Qi + A
TXi + XiA −
N X
j6=i







TXi = 0 (56)






TXi is stable for each i =1 ,...,N (57)
A
T









Then the N-tuple ( ¯ F1,..., ¯ FN)d e ﬁned by





23is a hard-bounded Nash equilibrium, and
¯ J
HB







Proof We have to show that the functional φ : F 7→ ¯ JHB
i ( ¯ F−i(F),x 0) is minimal
in the set
{F ∈ I R
mi×n | A −
PN
j6=i SjXj + BiF is stable }.
if F = ¯ Fi.W eh a v e
¯ J
HB






















x + Ew, x(0) = x0.
Note that the functional φ coincides with the functional J,a sd e ﬁned in Theorem
4.1, with A replaced by A −
PN
j6=i SjXj, B := Bi, r := ri, Q := Qi +
PN
j6=i XjSijXj,
R := Rii, and the same values for E and x0. It is easily seen that the condi-
tions (55)—(59) guarantee that the conditions (44)—(48) are satisﬁed with X := Xi,








Note that the solvability of (59) is unclear. In the one-player case, the left-hand
side of (59) is decreasing in γ for γ > γ∗.I n t h e N-player case, we deal with a
coupled system of N nonlinear equations in the unknowns γ1,...,γN w h i c hn e e dt o
be solved in a set Γ,d e ﬁned as the collection of N-tuples (γ1,...,γN)o fn o n z e r o
real numbers with the property that there exists an N-tuple X1,...,X N satisfying
(55)—(57).
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper we studied the existence of Nash equilibria in linear-quadratic diﬀeren-
tial games on an inﬁnite planning horizon if the system is disturbed by deterministic
noise and the strategy spaces are of the static linear feedback type. We considered
the soft-constrained and hard-bounded cases. For the soft-constrained case we dis-
cussed the general indeﬁnite control problem. For the hard-bounded case we just
considered the deﬁnite control problem.
The soft-constrained problem has been extensively discussed for the one-player
case. A set of suﬃcient conditions was given under which we can conclude that there
exists a saddlepoint solution. Under a further restriction on the strategy spaces,
some of these conditions were found to be necessary as well. In the scalar case,
we have provided necessary and suﬃcient conditions for existence of a saddlepoint
24solution. It turns out that these conditions are intimately related to the question
whether the outer optimization takes place over a connected set or not.
As u ﬃcient condition was provided for the existence of soft-constrained equilibria
in the N-player case, and it was argued that for the two-player scalar case one can
expect that the corresponding algebraic Riccati equations again have from zero up
to three solutions. For the deﬁnite control problem one can show (see Ref. 13) that
the soft-constrained equilibria can also be interpreted in a stochastic environment
as risk-sensitive equilibria.
Finally, we derived suﬃcient conditions for existence of hard-bounded equilibria.
We indicated an algorithm to calculate such equilibria. Considerable development is
still required to get eﬃcient numerical methods for solving the systems of equations
associated with the equilibria that we have discussed; this is left as an item of future
research.
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